Showing posts with label Securities and Exchange Commission. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Securities and Exchange Commission. Show all posts

Wednesday, October 3, 2012

SEC Sues the One Rating Firm Not on Wall Street’s Take


Bloomberg
William D. Cohan


The Securities and Exchange Commission, it seems, has finally lost its mind.

In April, motivated by what I consider pure maliciousness, the SEC initiated a “cease and desist” administrative proceeding it deemed “necessary for the protection of investors and in the public interest” against Egan-Jones Ratings Co., a privately owned, 20-person firm based in Haverford, Pennsylvania, and against its principal owner, Sean Egan.


Egan-Jones, founded in 1995, is one of nine ratings companies that the SEC has accredited as “nationally recognized,” allowing the firm to rate the debt of sovereign nations, companies and asset-backed securities, among others. Notably, it is the only one of the nine that gets paid by investors instead of by the issuers of securities.
The bigger and better-known ratings companies -- Standard & Poor’s (owned by McGraw-Hill Cos. (MHP)), Moody’s Corp. (MCO) and Fitch Ratings Ltd. -- are paid by the Wall Street banks that underwrite the debt securities of corporate issuers. That is, the companies are beholden to the sellers of the products they are supposed to pass judgment on, not the buyers. That’s akin to allowing the Hollywood studios to pay the nation’s film critics for their opinions.

Shopping Around

We all saw the result in 2007 and 2008. A major cause of the financial crisis was that S&P, Moody’s and Fitch, while being paid hundreds of millions of dollars by Wall Street, gave AAA ratings to complicated, risky securities that turned out to be anything but AAA. If a big bank didn’t like a proposed rating, it just shopped the deal until it found a firm that would provide something it liked better.
Who can forget this memorable April 2007 instant-message exchange between two S&P analysts, Rahul Dilip Shah and Shannon Mooney?
“Btw, that deal is ridiculous,” Shah wrote to Mooney about some mortgage securities they were asked to rate.
“I know, right . . . model def(initely) does not capture half the risk,” she replied.
“We should not be rating it,” he answered.
“We rate every deal,” Mooney replied. “It could be structured by cows and we would rate it.”
You would have thought that after the crisis exposed this kind of abhorrent behavior -- to say nothing of the obvious conflict of interest -- the SEC would have considered scrapping the issuer-pays model on ratings. You might have even thought the SEC would have sued S&P, Moody’s and Fitch for their reckless conduct.
Alas, such obvious steps are out of the question at an SEC headed by Mary Schapiro, who previously led the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Wall Street’s self-financed, self-serving watchdog organization. (When Schapiro left Finra, it gave her a $9 million bonus).
True, for a while, the SEC put on a good show of wanting to reform the ratings companies. It held round-table discussions with interested parties to discuss rectifying the horrific shortcomings of S&P, Moody’s and Fitch. Robert Khuzami, the SEC’s chief enforcement officer, suggested in an interview with Reuters a year ago that the SEC was considering a lawsuit against S&P for its role in the financial collapse. But in the end, nothing changed. The issuer-pays model is still the dominant architecture for the ratings firms.

Debt Downgrade

Now, incredibly, Egan-Jones is the sole rater that the SEC has decided to attack. The trouble for the firm started on July 16, 2011, when Egan-Jones downgraded the U.S.’s sovereign debt by one notch, to AA+ from AAA. Egan-Jones cited “the relatively high level of debt and the difficulty in significantly cutting spending.” Two days later, the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations contacted the firm seeking information about its rating decision. (The next month, S&P also downgraded the U.S.’s sovereign debt, but neither Moody’s nor Fitch did.)
Then, on Oct. 12, Egan-Jones received a call from the SEC notifying the firm of a Wells Notice, an indication that it was being investigated. On April 5 of this year, Egan-Jones again downgraded the U.S. sovereign debt, to AA from AA+. On April 19, leaks started emanating from the SEC that it had voted to start an “administrative law proceeding” against the firm. And on April 24, the SEC filed its complaint.
Just what does the SEC object to so vehemently about Egan- Jones? The commission claims that on its 2008 supplemental application to be a “nationally recognized” ratings firm, Egan- Jones “falsely stated” that it had already rated the credit of 150 asset-backed securities and of 50 sovereign-debt issues. The SEC claims Egan-Jones “willfully made these misstatements and omissions to conceal the fact that it had no experience issuing ratings on ABS or government issuers.” The SEC intends to fine Egan-Jones and to possibly censure Sean Egan -- neither move would be good for business.
Egan says the SEC is making a mountain out of a molehill. He says the paperwork requirements to comply with the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, which had been passed by Congress in 2006, was still being worked out, and that the SEC has had no problem with his firm’s annual applications since then.
His lawyer, Alan S. Futerfas, told the Wall Street Journal that the SEC knows that Egan did rate the securities in question but it is “saying he didn’t disseminate it publicly.” Futerfas continued: “It’s a very technical argument the SEC is using; it’s not substantive. There’s nothing in this complaint that suggests or alleges that any rating was without integrity or was not accurate or was not predictive.”
If he is right, that raises a question: Is the SEC retaliating against Egan and his firm for downgrading the U.S. sovereign debt?

Principled Stand

Egan told me he is determined to fight the charges because “the issuer-paid rating firms were identified as a significant source” of the worst economic catastrophe since the Great Depression, and yet the SEC’s “response has been to hobble, in any way possible, the most vocal counterbalance to those inflated ratings.”
Egan is standing on principle even though his legal fees will probably far exceed a fine if he loses. “Anybody who looks at this would realize that this is wrong,” he said. “It provides an opportunity for a spotlight on what’s been going on over the recent past, and hopefully it will change so that it’s a more even playing field.”
Don’t get your hopes up for that, Mr. Egan.
(William D. Cohan, the author of “Money and Power: How Goldman Sachs Came to Rule the World,” is a Bloomberg View columnist. The opinions expressed are his own.)
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To contact the writer of this article: William D. Cohan at wdcohan@yahoo.com.
To contact the editor responsible for this article: Tobin Harshaw at tharshaw@bloomberg.net.




Monday, August 6, 2012

As Libor Fault-Finding Grows, It Is Now Every Bank for Itself

NYTimes

The Barclays settlement prompted the resignation of top executives,
including the chief executive, Robert E. Diamond Jr., and helped to erase more than
$3 billion of the bank’s market value.
Major banks, which often band together when facing government scrutiny, are now turning on one another as an international investigation into the manipulation of interest rates gains momentum.
With billions of dollars and their reputations on the line, financial institutions have been spreading the blame in recent meetings with authorities, according to government and bank officials with knowledge of the matter. While acknowledging their own wrongdoing, institutions are pointing out actions at other banks that they believe are worse — and in some cases, extend to top executives.

One official involved in the case said that banks are emphasizing that “we’re not as bad as the next guy.”

The Swiss bank UBS, which has a history of regulatory run-ins, has shared e-mails, instant messages and other information suggesting it had colluded with traders at Deutsche Bank,HSBC and the Royal Bank of Scotland to manipulate key interest rates, according to court documents and bank employees. In talks with authorities, HSBC is providing its own account of the activities, according to a lawyer briefed on the matter. Citigroup has also detailed rate manipulation with other banks.

When the British bank Barclays recently negotiated a settlement with authorities, it highlighted that other European institutions took part in the rate-rigging scheme, said officials close to the case. Like UBS, Barclays has provided information on activities involving HSBC and Deutsche Bank.

Several banks are using Barclays’ $450 million settlement as a guidepost in preliminary discussions with authorities. JPMorgan Chase and Citigroup are each emphasizing to authorities that their chief executives were not implicated in the wrongdoing as in the case of Barclays, and therefore the banks deserve to be treated less severely, according to the officials.

A Deutsche Bank manager who oversaw traders is facing scrutiny, according to a person involved in the case. However, a Deutsche Bank spokesman said no managers or top executives had been aware of any rate manipulation, adding that the investigation was continuing.

JPMorgan, Deutsche Bank, HSBC and Citigroup have said they are cooperating with officials.
Authorities around the world are investigating more than 10 big banks for their roles in setting global interest rates like the London interbank offered rate, or Libor. Such benchmarks underpin trillions of dollars of financial products, including mortgages and student loans.

Regulators are examining whether banks colluded to move the rates up or down to get extra profits and limit losses on their trading positions. Some banks are also under investigation for reporting artificially low rates to make themselves appear financially healthier.

When banks first started conducting internal investigations at the behest of regulators two years ago, they figured the potential penalties would be manageable, according to bank officials.

But the size of the Barclays settlement and the growing public outcry have left banks scrambling to limit their culpability as the threat of criminal actions increases. Part of the banks’ problem is that their internal investigations have created a road map that authorities are using to pursue criminal and civil cases.
Those findings provide a detailed portrait of the wrongdoing.

Interviews with dozens of government and bank officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the investigation is developing, and a review of court documents and regulatory filings show varying degrees of exposure. Banks like UBS, Deutsche Bank and Citigroup uncovered that employees had worked with traders at other firms to influence rates, according to government and bank officials. A small number of institutions, including Credit Suisse and Bank of America, found more limited actions.
The extent of the evidence has created an every-bank-for-itself attitude.

The financial industry often tries to negotiate a common deal to avoid getting singled out for bad behavior. This year, five banks collectively struck a multibillion-dollar agreement with federal authorities to address foreclosureabuses.

With the rate investigation, institutions are not sharing information or even discussing the case with rivals, according to lawyers involved in the matter. In part, they do not want to appear to have close ties with their rivals, since such cozy relationships are part of the government’s inquiry.
“There is no information-sharing among banks unlike the past 15 years of federal investigations,” said a lawyer involved in the case.

Thursday, August 18, 2011

SEC Destroys 9,000 Fraud Files Involving Wells Fargo, Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Morgan Stanley, Lehman

Mish's Global Economic Trend

Senator Chuck Grassley, Republican of Iowa, says SEC may have destroyed documents
“From what I’ve seen, it looks as if the SEC might have sanctioned some level of case-related document destruction,” said Sen. Chuck Grassley, Republican of Iowa, in a letter to the agency’s chairman, Mary Schapiro.

“It doesn’t make sense that an agency responsible for investigations would want to get rid of potential evidence. If these charges are true, the agency needs to explain why it destroyed documents, how many documents it destroyed over what timeframe, and to what extent its actions were consistent with the law.”

Agency staff “destroyed over 9,000 files” related to preliminary agency investigations, according to a letter sent in July to Grassley, the top Republican on the Senate Judiciary Committee, and obtained by MarketWatch.

The allegations were made by SEC enforcement attorney, Darcy Flynn, in a letter to Grassley. Flynn is a current employee, and according to the letter, received a bonus for his past year’s work.

Flynn alleges the SEC destroyed files related to matters being examined in important cases such as Bernard Madoff and a $50 billion Ponzi scheme he operated as well as an investigation involving Goldman Sachs Group Inc. trading in American International Group credit-default swaps in 2009.

Flynn also alleged that the agency destroyed documents and information collected for preliminary investigations at Wells Fargo, Bank of America,, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Morgan Stanley, and the now-bankrupt Lehman Brothers.

The letter goes into particular detail about Deutsche Bank, the former employer of current SEC enforcement chief Robert Khuzami as well as former enforcement chiefs Gary Lynch and Richard Walker.

The allegations that the SEC destroyed documents were first reported by the Rolling Stone magazine in a report Wednesday.
Senator Grassley's Letter to the SEC

Inquiring minds may be interested in Senator Grassley's Letter to the SEC

Slap of the Wrist of MarketWatch

Once again I am irritated by articles and authors who quote other sources and do not have the decency to post a link. In this case the author is Ronald D. Orol, a MarketWatch reporter, based in Washington.

Orol should have caught that and if not the editors at MarketWatch should have caught it.

Is the SEC Covering Up Wall Street Crimes?

Please consider Rolling Stone: Is the SEC Covering Up Wall Street Crimes? by Matt Taibbi
Imagine a world in which a man who is repeatedly investigated for a string of serious crimes, but never prosecuted, has his slate wiped clean every time the cops fail to make a case. No more Lifetime channel specials where the murderer is unveiled after police stumble upon past intrigues in some old file – “Hey, chief, didja know this guy had two wives die falling down the stairs?” No more burglary sprees cracked when some sharp cop sees the same name pop up in one too many witness statements. This is a different world, one far friendlier to lawbreakers, where even the suspicion of wrongdoing gets wiped from the record.

That, it now appears, is exactly how the Securities and Exchange Commission has been treating the Wall Street criminals who cratered the global economy a few years back. For the past two decades, according to a whistle-blower at the SEC who recently came forward to Congress, the agency has been systematically destroying records of its preliminary investigations once they are closed. By whitewashing the files of some of the nation’s worst financial criminals, the SEC has kept an entire generation of federal investigators in the dark about past inquiries into insider trading, fraud and market manipulation against companies like Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank and AIG. With a few strokes of the keyboard, the evidence gathered during thousands of investigations – “18,000 … including Madoff,” as one high-ranking SEC official put it during a panicked meeting about the destruction – has apparently disappeared forever into the wormhole of history.

Under a deal the SEC worked out with the National Archives and Records Administration, all of the agency’s records – “including case files relating to preliminary investigations” – are supposed to be maintained for at least 25 years. But the SEC, using history-altering practices that for once actually deserve the overused and usually hysterical term “Orwellian,” devised an elaborate and possibly illegal system under which staffers were directed to dispose of the documents from any preliminary inquiry that did not receive approval from senior staff to become a full-blown, formal investigation. Amazingly, the wholesale destruction of the cases – known as MUIs, or “Matters Under Inquiry” – was not something done on the sly, in secret. The enforcement division of the SEC even spelled out the procedure in writing, on the commission’s internal website. “After you have closed a MUI that has not become an investigation,” the site advised staffers, “you should dispose of any documents obtained in connection with the MUI.”
That is the opening snip. The entire article is worth a read.

I rather suspect the SEC has safeguarded with perfect care the files on Martha Stewart, two-bit Joe, and blogger Bob.