U.S. can't account for $8.7 billion of Iraq's money: audit

Reuters

The U.S. Department of Defense was unable to account properly for $8.7 billion of Iraqi oil and gas money meant for humanitarian needs and reconstruction after the 2003 invasion, according to an audit released on Tuesday.

 The figure is nearly 96 percent of the $9.1 billion funneled to the Pentagon from the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI), said the audit report from the U.S. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR).

The report described lax management of some of the billions of dollars designated for rebuilding war-shattered Iraq, where residents routinely complain about lack of electricity and other basic services more than seven years after the invasion.

The DFI was established by the Coalition Provisional Authority, the U.S.-run body that took charge of Iraq following the invasion.

It was meant to harness money from export sales of oil, petroleum products and natural gas, as well as frozen Iraqi assets and surplus funds from the U.N. oil-for-food program, and spend it for the benefit of Iraqis. The U.N. Security Council approved the creation of the fund.

"Weaknesses in DoD's financial and management controls left it unable to properly account for $8.7 billion of the $9.1 billion in DFI funds it received for reconstruction activities in Iraq," the SIGIR report said.

The report cited poor record-keeping and said most of the organizations at the Pentagon that received DFI funds failed to establish required Treasury Department accounts.

"Our selective review shows the records were not always complete. For example, DoD could not provide documentation to substantiate how it spent $2.6 billion," it said.

The government of Iraq ordered the Pentagon to return DFI funds at the end of 2007. But the audit found Department of Defense organizations that were still holding and in some cases spending DFI funds.

"The breakdown in controls left the funds vulnerable to inappropriate uses and undetected loss," the report said.

Iraq is almost completely reliant on oil revenues to rebuild infrastructure and housing stock devastated by years of war and economic sanctions. More than 95 percent of the federal budget comes from the oil sector.

The audit report said the Pentagon had agreed to adopt and implement by November the inspector-general's recommendations to tighten up financial controls.

"SIGIR believes the identified actions, if implemented as planned, will address SIGIR's concerns," the report said.

China Has Divested 97 Percent of Its Holdings in U.S. Treasury Bills

CNSNews
Terence P. Jeffrey

China Divests 97% of Treasury Holdings

China has dropped 97 percent of its holdings in U.S. Treasury bills, decreasing its ownership of the short-term U.S. government securities from a peak of $210.4 billion in May 2009 to $5.69 billion in March 2011, the most recent month reported by the U.S. Treasury.


Treasury bills are securities that mature in one year or less that are sold by the U.S. Treasury Department to fund the nation’s debt.

Mainland Chinese holdings of U.S. Treasury bills are reported in column 9 of the Treasury report linked here.

Until October, the Chinese were generally making up for their decreasing holdings in Treasury bills by increasing their holdings of longer-term U.S. Treasury securities. Thus, until October, China’s overall holdings of U.S. debt continued to increase.

Since October, however, China has also started to divest from longer-term U.S. Treasury securities. Thus, as reported by the Treasury Department, China’s ownership of the U.S. national debt has decreased in each of the last five months on record, including November, December, January, February and March. 

Prior to the fall of 2008, acccording to Treasury Department data, Chinese ownership of short-term Treasury bills was modest, standing at only $19.8 billion in August of that year. But when President George W. Bush signed legislation to authorize a $700-billion bailout of the U.S. financial industry in October 2008 and President Barack Obama signed a $787-billion economic stimulus law in February 2009, Chinese ownership of short-term U.S. Treasury bills skyrocketed.

By December 2008, China owned $165.2 billion in U.S. Treasury bills, according to the Treasury Department. By March 2009, Chinese Treasury bill holdings were at $191.1 billion. By May 2009, Chinese holdings of Treasury bills were peaking at $210.4 billion.

However, China’s overall appetite for U.S. debt increased over a longer span than did its appetite for short-term U.S. Treasury bills.

In August 2008, before the bank bailout and the stimulus law, overall Chinese holdings of U.S. debt stood at $573.7 billion. That number continued to escalate past May 2009-- when China started to reduce its holdings in short-term Treasury bills--and ultimately peaked at $1.1753 trillion last October.
As of March 2011, overall Chinese holdings of U.S. debt had decreased to 1.1449 trillion.

Most of the U.S. national debt is made up of publicly marketable securities sold by the Treasury Department and I.O.U.s called “intragovernmental” bonds that the Treasury has given to so-called government trust funds—such as the Social Security trust funds—when it has spent the trust funds’ money on other government expenses.

The publicly marketable segment of the national debt includes Treasury bills, which (as defined by the Treasury) mature in terms of one-year or less; Treasury notes, which mature in terms of 2 to 10 years; Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS), which mature in terms of 5, 10 and 30 years; and Treasury bonds, which mature in terms of 30 years.

At the end of August 2008, before the financial bailout and the stimulus, the publicly marketable segment of the U.S. national debt was 4.88 trillion. Of that, $2.56 trillion was in the intermediate-term Treasury notes, $1.22 trillion was in short-term Treasury bills, $582.8 billion was in long-term Treasury bonds, and $521.3 billion was in TIPS.

At the end of March 2011, by which time the Chinese had dropped their Treasury bill holdings 97 percent from their peak, the publicly marketable segment of the U.S. national debt had almost doubled from August 2008, hitting $9.11 trillion. Of that $9.11 trillion, $5.8 trillion was in intermediate-term Treasury notes, $1.7 trillion was in short-term Treasury bills; $931.5 billion was in long-term Treasury bonds, and $640.7 billion was in TIPS.

Before the end of March 2012, the Treasury must redeem all of the $1.7 trillion in Treasury bills that were extant as of March 2011 and find new or old buyers who will continue to invest in U.S. debt. But, for now, the Chinese at least do not appear to be bullish customers of short-term U.S. debt.
Treasury bills carry lower interest rates than longer-term Treasury notes and bonds, but the longer term notes and bonds are exposed to a greater risk of losing their value to inflation. To the degree that the $1.7 trillion in short-term U.S. Treasury bills extant as of March must be converted into longer-term U.S. Treasury securities, the U.S. government will be forced to pay a higher annual interest rate on the national debt.\

As of the close of business on Thursday, the total U.S. debt was $14.34 trillion, according to the Daily Treasury Statement. Of that, approximately $9.74 trillion was debt held by the public and approximately $4.61 trillion was “intragovernmental” debt.

Reports Of Mortgage Fraud Rose To Record Level Last Year

William Alden
Alden@huffingtonpost.com 

After the housing market crashed, reports of suspected mortgage fraud soared.




As lenders, homeowners and brokers rushed to close deals, the process during the boom years was tainted by fakery, according to reports later submitted to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, an agency of the Treasury Department. The number of reports of suspected mortgage fraud rose to its highest level on record last year, as 70,472 reports were submitted to the government agency, according to a new release from the LexisNexis Mortgage Asset Research Institute.


That's nearly double the number of cases reported in 2006 when the market was at its peak, and it's nearly 22 times the number of cases reported in 2000. From the LexisNexis release:

Fraudsters thrive on inadequacies within lengthy loan-related processes and a lack of consistency across organizations and/or industries that help them hide their true motives. Technology has enabled faster loan production through automation, ease of processing, and analytics. Industry professionals have keen knowledge of those processes, which makes it much easier to manipulate protocols in place to thwart adverse activities.

The number of verified cases of mortgage fraud declined from 2009 to 2010, but that's partially attributable to a decline in the number of new loans, the LexisNexis report says. Reports of suspected fraud increased nearly 5 percent during that period.

Homeowners and investors have filed numerous lawsuits against mortgage companies, claiming that crucial mortgage documents were misplaced or even forged. Some of these suits have been successful, bolstered by testimony from bank employees. In a widely cited example, an employee of the lender now owned by Bank of America testified in a New Jersey court in 2009 that her company regularly held onto mortgage notes even as the loans were sold to investors, contradicting what contracts usually require.

Without a note, a bank cannot prove it has a right to foreclose on a home; homeowners have used the absence of a note to contest foreclosures. Likewise, a missing note compromises the legal rights of an investor in a mortgage security, a situation that has prompted some investors to sue the banks that sold them the securities.

But it's not just the banks who have been accused of fraud. The Wall Street Journal describes a practice some brokers allegedly used, in which they would get artificially low valuations of distressed homes, and then help a buyer sell those homes for a profit.

Homeowners, too, have been accused of misstating their income on mortgage documents. One borrower is now serving a 21-month prison sentence for mortgage fraud, the New York Times reported.
The chiefs of the lenders that helped fuel this boom, meanwhile, have largely escaped punishment.

Examples of alleged fraud extend to the foreclosure process as well. When it came out last fall that employees at foreclosure processing companies would sign thousands of foreclosure documents daily without even reading them, some of the county's biggest lenders temporarily halted their foreclosures.

The nation's five biggest mortgage lenders -- Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase and Ally Financial -- have been accused of wrongfully foreclosing on homeowners and improperly handling mortgages. All 50 state attorneys general along with the Obama administration are working to reach a settlement deal. Fines could reach $30 billion, The Huffington Post reported.

JPMorgan Suspending Foreclosures

New York Times

In a sign that the entire foreclosure process is coming under pressure, a second major mortgage lender said that it was suspending court cases against defaulting homeowners so it could review its legal procedures.

The lender, JPMorgan Chase, said on Wednesday that it was halting 56,000 foreclosures because some of its employees might have improperly prepared the necessary documents. All of the suspensions are in the 23 states where foreclosures must be approved by a court, including New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Florida and Illinois.

The bank, which lends through its Chase Mortgage unit, has begun to “systematically re-examine” its filings to verify that they meet legal standards, a spokesman, Tom Kelly, said.

Last week, GMAC Mortgage said it was suspending an undisclosed number of foreclosures to give it time to take a closer look at its own procedures. GMAC simultaneously began withdrawing affidavits in pending court cases, throwing their future into doubt.

Chase and GMAC, in their zeal to process hundreds of thousands of foreclosures as quickly as possible and get those properties on the market, employed people who could sign documents so quickly they popularized a new term for them: “robo-signer.”

In depositions taken by lawyers for embattled homeowners, the robo-signers said they or their team had signed 10,000 or more foreclosure affidavits a month.

Now that haste has come back to haunt them. The affidavits in foreclosures attest that the preparer personally reviewed the files, which those workers acknowledge they had no time to do.

GMAC and Chase say that their lapses were technical and will soon be remedied with new filings. But defense lawyers are seizing on these revelations and say they will now work to have their cases thrown out.

Beyond the relative handful of foreclosure cases being contested are many more in which the homeowner did not have legal counsel. Potentially, hundreds of thousands of cases could be in doubt.

GMAC’s initial disclosures prompted challenges or investigations from attorneys general in Iowa, Illinois, Colorado, California and North Carolina. The Treasury Department, which became the majority owner of GMAC after providing $17 billion in bailout money, has directed the lender to correct its procedures.

The pressure on the lender, which began as the auto financing arm of General Motors, is continuing to increase. Senator Al Franken, Democrat of Minnesota, asked Wednesday for the Treasury, the Justice Department and other regulators to collaborate on “a thorough investigation into the alleged misconduct.”

Defense lawyers have consistently complained that the lenders’ law firms were sending through cases that were at best sloppy. The Florida attorney general’s office says it is investigating four so-called foreclosure mills.

“The GMAC announcement was the mushroom cloud,” said one Florida defense lawyer, Matthew Weidner. “The fallout will burn through the entire mortgage servicing industry.”

Judges who oversee a lot of foreclosure cases increasingly agree that there is a serious problem.

“I don’t want to say that every one of these cases is wrong and a fraud on the court, but it is a big concern for us,” J. Thomas McGrady, chief judge of the Sixth Judicial Circuit in Florida, said in an interview last week after GMAC’s announcement.

Judge McGrady predicted that the foreclosure process in Florida, which the Legislature has been trying to speed up, would have to slow down.

“Everyone is going to have to look at these cases more closely,” said Judge McGrady, whose circuit includes St. Petersburg.

The foreclosure process in many states is already torpid. This benefits delinquent homeowners, who can live in their properties free for years, as well as lenders who do not have to write down the value of the original loan. But it also threatens to prolong the housing crisis for many years.

Chase said that unlike GMAC, it had not withdrawn any affidavits in pending cases. It also said that if foreclosures were completed, it was allowing its agents to proceed with the sale of the properties. GMAC has stopped its sales.

Chase followed the lead of GMAC in playing down the impact of the situation. “Affidavits were prepared by appropriate personnel with knowledge of the relevant facts based on their review of the company’s books and records,” the spokesman, Mr. Kelly, said.

But many questions are unresolved. One is whether completed foreclosures will be vulnerable to what GMAC is calling “corrective action.” If those former homeowners press their claims, they could conceivably dislodge the new buyers.

Such cases are probably not imminent. The more immediate consequences for the lenders using robo-signers will be determined by the homeowners who are fighting their cases in court.

Lilliana DeCoursy, a real estate agent in Safety Harbor, Fla., has a rental property in foreclosure with GMAC. Now that the lender has withdrawn the affidavit in her case, Ms. DeCoursy said she was determined to press every advantage.

“I think they should have to answer for this,” she said.

William Neuman contributed reporting.