Wired
David Axe
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| Don Harvel, near his home in Georgia. |
What Harvel discovered about the controversial hybrid aircraft drew him into a battle of wills with his superiors at Air Force Special Operations Command. Harvel, then a brigadier general, uncovered evidence of mechanical problems — and resulting safety woes — in the V-22 Osprey, which takes off like a helicopter and flies like an airplane. These are issues the Pentagon has been eager to downplay. So when Harvel refused to alter his findings to match the Defense Department’s expectations, he knew that was the final chapter of his decades-long military service. Harvel’s long-planned retirement was held up for more than two years, effectively silencing him during a troubling chapter in the Osprey’s often-troubled history.
“I turned [my report] in and I knew that my career was done,” Harvel says.
Despite three decades of development costing billions of dollars, the V-22 is still not nearly as safe as its proponents insist. In the past year alone, the military has assigned full blame for two Osprey crashes – one of them fatal – on pilot error. Those calls were questionable, at best. The Pentagon and the V-22′s manufacturers likewise dismissed concern over two emergency landings by stricken Ospreys. All the while, Harvel had to keep quiet.
No longer. In an exclusive interview, Harvel says the military is “trying to turn all eyes away” from the Osprey’s ongoing safety woes. “Especially in Congress.”
After all, Congress controls funding for the $36-billion V-22 program, and has the power to finance (or not) the U.S. Marines and Air Force as they work to more than triple their Osprey fleets. The military is beginning to rely on the temperamental but high-performance tiltrotors for a wider range of important missions; there’s even talk of Ospreys hauling the White House entourage on presidential trips. The Pentagon has also laid out a controversial plan to base 24 Ospreys in Japan. The Defense Department insisted that the speedy, long-range tiltrotor is “critical” to its Pacific war plans, but Japanese officials have justifiably questioned the V-22′s safety.
Harvel’s retirement paperwork finally cleared a few weeks ago. Now, the former Texas Air National Guard C-130 pilot is free to publicly share his opinion about the Osprey: that it’s “just not quite there yet.” The two crashes and another incident this year are proof of that.
“We need to invest money to fix this thing or change the way we’re operating it,” Harvel says. But the Pentagon has other priorities, he adds. “One of the things that is most noticeable to me is the military trying to get the [Air Force] CV- and [Marine] MV-22 to the forefront to get as much positive publicity as possible.”
Lead Investigator
On April 9, 2010, an Osprey assigned to Air Force Special Operations Command was preparing to drop off a squad of U.S. Army Rangers in southern Afghanistan when something went wrong. The tiltrotor was traveling at least 88 miles per hour — several times the recommended landing speed — when it smashed into the ground a quarter mile from the landing zone. Four people died.
A sudden tailwind could have been a factor, but there’s another possible explanation: that the Osprey’s engines had malfunctioned in mid-air. Video shot by an A-10 attack plane overhead showed puffs of exhaust coming from the V-22′s nacelles, a sign that the crew was trying to restart non-working engines.
After a brief recovery operation, an A-10 bombed the wreckage to keep it out of militants’ hands. The air strike destroyed the tiltrotor’s black box. That, plus memory loss by Brian Luce, the only survivor from the two-man cockpit, ensured that the crash investigation board would face a difficult task.
At the time, Harvel was a full-time airline pilot and part-time assistant to the chief of Air Force Special Operations Command. Since getting his pilot’s wings in 1976, he had racked up an impressive 4,000 flight hours in OH-58 helicopters, T-37 and T-38 training jets and C-130s.
“I got a call from the vice commander [Lt. Gen. Kurt Cichowski] saying we’re considering you for board president and asking if I would be willing take time off,” Harvel says. “I had been to all the safety schools and said I would love to do that. I was familiar with the V-22 aircraft, having flown in the simulator a few times. They knew me at AFSOC and were comfortable with me — that was a real big deal to them.”
Harvel recruited a team of technical experts and requested permission to travel to Afghanistan; he was determined to see the wreckage for himself and talk to survivors while their memories were still fresh.
But Cichowski shot down the request. “He said ‘you don’t need to go to Afghanistan,’” Harvel recalls. “That was my first clue this wasn’t going to be a standard investigation.” But Harvel kept arguing for permission to travel and ultimately got the green light. In whirlwind six-day trip, Harvel and his team interviewed 100 witnesses to the crash and its aftermath.
Weighing all the evidence, Harvel’s board concluded that, among 10 possible contributing factors, engine failure was the most likely cause of the crash. But after reviewing a draft of the report, Cichowski allegedly ordered Harvel to remove the reference to the engines. “I don’t know why he … would not keep an open mind,” Harvel says. “I do know this would have brought the [V-22] weapon system under more scrutiny.”
The Air Force insists Cichowski did not put pressure on Harvel. “Undue influence, real or perceived, by the convening authority or its staff is specifically prohibited by regulation,” says Capt. Kristen Duncan, an AFSOC spokesperson. “The AIB operated autonomously throughout the investigation, and the command has full confidence in the integrity, veracity and due diligence of the Accident Investigation Board.”
In any event, Harvel refused to alter the report. ”I had planned to retire, anyhow,” Harvel recalls, “so I expedited it. And said I was standing by to brief the families [of crash victims] and he [Cichowski] said, ‘you’re not going to do that.’” (Other Air Force officials talked to the families instead, Duncan says.)











